U.S.-China ties face long-term strategic competition with limited cooperation. Both sides seek dominance in tech, security, and global rules, while managing deep interdependence.
I. Structural Transformation: U.S.-China Relations Entering the Early Stage of a “New Cold War”
1.1 A Natural Result of Shifting Global Power Structures
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the world has entered a phase of relative power diffusion. China, as a “revisionist rising power,” is reshaping parts of the international order, directly challenging U.S. global leadership. This leads to a structural contradiction, often described as a modern version of the Thucydides Trap, where a rising power threatens to displace an established hegemon.
1.2 “Systemic Competition” Replaces Strategic Partnership
• The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy labels China as “the only competitor with both the intent and the capability to reshape the international order.”
• The U.S. approach toward China now involves a three-pronged strategy: military containment, technological blockade, and narrative dominance.
• Ideological divergence has evolved into systemic governance rivalry, not just values-based differences.
1.3 Characteristics of the “New Cold War” vs. U.S.-Soviet Cold War
| Aspect | U.S.-Soviet Cold War | U.S.-China Relations |
|---|---|---|
| Ideological Confrontation | Intense | Moderate but present |
| Military Confrontation | Nuclear deterrence | Mainly regional (Indo-Pacific) |
| Economic Interdependence | Virtually none | Deeply intertwined |
| Technological Systems | Fully separated | Decoupling in progress |
Aspect U.S.-Soviet Cold War U.S.-China Relations
Ideological Confrontation Intense Moderate but present
Military Confrontation Nuclear deterrence Mainly regional (Indo-Pacific)
Economic Interdependence Virtually none Deeply intertwined
Technological Systems Fully separated Decoupling in progress
II. Strategic Flashpoints: Multi-Dimensional Competition for Global Leadership
2.1 Technology Sovereignty as the Core Battleground
• The U.S. uses a combination of the CHIPS Act, export controls, and allied coordination to restrict China’s access to high-end semiconductors and equipment.
• China has responded by pursuing self-reliance in strategic technologies, building an indigenous tech ecosystem (e.g., Huawei, SMIC, Cambricon).
• Future competition will intensify in AI, quantum computing, biotech, and space technologies.
2.2 Geopolitical Hotspots: Taiwan as the Most Explosive Issue
• The U.S. continues its policy of “using Taiwan to contain China,” via arms sales and political exchanges.
• China emphasizes the non-negotiability of the One-China Principle, responding with military, legal, and diplomatic countermeasures.
• The key risk lies in miscalculation or third-party provocations escalating into open conflict.
2.3 Global Governance and Discourse Power
• China promotes alternative governance initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative.
• The U.S. seeks to rebuild Western-led norms through WTO reform, Indo-Pacific strategies, and institutional realignment.
• Narrative confrontation is escalating—particularly on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and human rights issues.
III. Remaining Space for Cooperation and Strategic Opportunity Windows
Despite intensified rivalry, there remains limited but crucial space for cooperation, especially in areas not tied to core security concerns:
3.1 Climate Change
• As the world’s two largest carbon emitters, the U.S. and China resumed high-level dialogue in 2023, including agreements on methane reduction.
• Opportunities include green finance, renewable energy technologies, and carbon market coordination.
3.2 Macroeconomic and Financial Stability
• Amid global inflation and interest rate hikes, monetary coordination—especially through IMF or G20 frameworks—remains vital.
• Exchange rate stabilization and trade balance management benefit both sides.
3.3 Public Health and Non-Traditional Security
• Despite early pandemic miscommunication, future cooperation may occur in vaccine R&D, health system reform, and epidemic preparedness.
• Cooperation remains essential in areas like cybercrime, telecom fraud, and transnational money laundering.
IV. Strategic Recommendations: Seizing Initiative in a Competitive Environment
4.1 For National Policymakers: Build a Resilient Strategic Buffer
• Strategic ambiguity with precise countermeasures: Avoid emotional confrontation; pursue “engage but hedge” tactics.
• Strengthen domestic resilience: Deepen the construction of a unified domestic market, advance “new productive forces,” and continue rural revitalization.
• Use multilateralism as a shield and regional cooperation as a spear: Leverage ASEAN, BRICS+, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America to expand international influence and balance U.S. pressure.
4.2 For Enterprises: Embrace a “Global Operation + China Base” Model
• Enhance geopolitical risk management capabilities, with internal political risk teams.
• Diversify export markets and supply chains, especially towards the Global South.
• Invest in legal compliance and international ESG standards to build resilience against extraterritorial sanctions.
• Focus tech investment on controllable innovation chains, such as open-source hardware, domestic EDA tools, and affordable AI chips.
V. Conclusion: Managing Rivalry and Shaping the Strategic Future
The U.S.-China relationship is unlikely to return to its prior era of cooperation, but it is also unlikely to rupture entirely. We are in a prelude to a new global order, where China must shift from passive adaptation to active strategic shaping.
The long-term future depends not only on managing differences but also on building mechanisms to coexist within competition, cultivate strategic resilience, and define the global narrative and rules of the 21st century.