Amid continued geopolitical tensions and the profound reshaping of the global energy landscape, the recent passage of the “Big Beautiful Bill” by the U.S. Congress marks a watershed policy event. The bill not only redefines U.S. support for new energy but also systematically excludes Chinese enterprises from America’s future energy strategy. On the surface, this appears to be a technical adjustment in fiscal, subsidy, and tax policy. In reality, it reflects a wholesale reprioritization of U.S. national security and signals a clear strategic divergence between China and the U.S. in green energy and high-tech industries.
Policy Shift: A Return to Fossil Fuels, Green Energy No Longer Favored
At its core, the legislation sends an unmistakable signal. On one hand, the U.S. will terminate multiple clean energy subsidy mechanisms under the Inflation Reduction Act, affecting tax incentives for wind, solar, and renewable electricity, marking the beginning of a phase-out in national support for clean energy. On the other hand, the bill specifically prohibits electric vehicles and key battery products containing supply chains from “China and other countries” from qualifying for tax credits, and formally introduces the “Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC)” mechanism, institutionally restricting Chinese-backed enterprises from participating in U.S. energy and high-tech projects. Essentially, this represents a “soft decoupling” from China’s green industrial chain, opening a new policy fissure in global new energy competition.
China’s Strategic Countermove: A Counter-Cyclical Opportunity in Green Development and Energy Self-Sufficiency
In contrast to America’s pullback, China has steadily advanced its green transition in recent years, building the world’s largest and fastest-growing clean energy system. Complete industrial chains have formed in wind, solar, green hydrogen, and pumped storage, all with strong international competitiveness. National strategies like “Eastern Data, Western Computing” are effectively connecting low-cost green power resources in the west with high computing demand in the east, providing critical support for the decarbonization of next-generation AI, data centers, and manufacturing.
Strategically, the policy divergence between China and the U.S. presents a counter-cyclical opportunity for China. China’s green industries can consolidate their upstream position in the global supply chain while leveraging robust green power infrastructure to supply emerging energy-intensive sectors with low-carbon support, strengthening the country’s endogenous technological development capacity. However, Western countries’ institutional, regulatory, and standard-setting barriers against Chinese firms are simultaneously rising, with early signs of “green protectionism” emerging in some markets.
Data Centers and AI Infrastructure: China’s Green Dividend and Hardware Bottlenecks
America’s weakening policy support for new energy also raises questions about its ability to remain the global hub for AI infrastructure. While the U.S. retains a clear lead in data center resources, chip design, and cloud computing, its increasingly costly energy mix poses structural challenges. By comparison, China is rapidly building a national green computing base: it leads the world in wind and solar capacity, enjoys significant electricity cost advantages, and the “Eastern Data, Western Computing” strategy continues to ease regional green power transmission bottlenecks, providing stable, low-carbon energy for AI model training.
If China can accelerate data center deployment in the next few years and build an integrated domestic ecosystem covering green power, chips, algorithms, models, and applications, its strategic autonomy in AI will be further strengthened. However, real risks remain: core computing hardware such as GPUs still rely on external supply chains, and any escalation in sanctions could create severe supply “chokepoints.” In addition, a brewing “compute race” among local governments risks resource waste and redundant construction, which calls for stronger central coordination.
EV Exports and Market Fragmentation: Opportunities and Frictions for Chinese Firms
In the auto sector, the U.S. EV subsidy revisions directly impact Chinese upstream battery producers—particularly companies like CATL and EVE Energy, which have significant exposure to U.S. markets and now face both order shrinkage and cost disadvantages. At the same time, U.S. domestic EV makers will see their subsidy advantage weaken, opening a limited window for Chinese vehicle exporters. Yet it is important to note that this opportunity is not a “net benefit”: related trade frictions and policy uncertainties have only become more pronounced, underscoring the need for China’s overseas expansion strategies to be upgraded and recalibrated.
Conclusion: Global Policy Divergence Brings New Opportunities
The enactment of the Big Beautiful Bill is a microcosm of the accelerating global fragmentation in green energy, technological sovereignty, and industrial self-reliance. In a world reshaped by geopolitical realignment and increasingly complex local rules, companies seeking sustainable growth overseas must shift their focus from cost and capacity alone to compliance and ecosystem building, from unilateral narratives to shared frameworks.
The true source of competitive advantage is no longer “how much you can make,” but “who accepts you, who trusts you.” In this new era defined by institutions and values, only by strengthening core technology, enhancing external compliance capabilities, and cultivating deeper mutual recognition can businesses secure greater strategic depth amid global volatility.