South Korea May Have Reached an Irreversible Tipping Point Amid a Decades-Long Fertility Crisis.
Population Crisis: Current Status and Statistics
South Korea is facing a severe population crisis characterized by ultra-low fertility, rapid aging, and natural population decline.
To maintain a stable population, each woman must give birth to an average of 2.1 children. In the 1950s, South Korean women had an average of six children; by the 1980s, the fertility rate had dropped below 2. In 2023, the national total fertility rate (TFR) reached a historic low of 0.72—the world’s lowest—falling to 0.55 in Seoul, far below the replacement level. In 2024, the number of births rose 3.6% to 238,000, still near record lows. From 2015, births declined for eight consecutive years, falling below 300,000 in 2020. Approximately half of all women have no children, while the other half typically have only one. If this trend continues, 100 South Koreans would give rise to only 36 children in the next generation, then 13, and just five in the following, meaning the population would shrink to 5% over four generations. In February 2025, monthly births dropped to 19,362—a new low, down 3.3% year-on-year.
By 2023, those aged 65 or older numbered 9.73 million, or 19% of the population. South Korea will officially become a “super-aged” society in December 2024 (with over 20% aged 65+). Currently, for every four 50-year-olds, there is only one 1-year-old child. By 2050, over 40% of the population is expected to be 65 or older. The working-age population (ages 15–64) is projected to fall from 71% in 2022 to 56.8% by 2040—lower than both China and the U.S.
South Korea experienced its first “death crossover” in 2020, with more deaths than births. That same year, Seoul’s population dropped below 10 million, falling to 1987 levels. In January 2023, there were only 23,179 births compared to 32,703 deaths, a record net population loss. In 2020, South Korea’s total population stood at 51.83 million, with 50.2% living in the capital region.
A Bleak Outlook for 2060
The effects of four decades of sub-replacement fertility have yet to fully materialize, and South Korea’s population, labor force, and GDP remain historically high. But the looming demographic train is approaching—initially slow, but ultimately catastrophic. If current trends persist, South Korea’s population may shrink to 28 million by 2100, or even lower. Oxford demographers warn that South Korea could become “the first nation to disappear.”
According to the UN’s low-fertility scenario—recently the most accurate projection—by 2060, the population will drop by 30%, with 16 million people gone. South Korea would become the most aged society in human history. Half of the population would be over 65, fewer than 10% under 25, and just 1% would be children. Streets would fall silent without the sound of playing children. Cities may be abandoned. Half the elderly would live alone or be packed into care homes, with a dwindling few left to keep society running.
Economic Collapse
The population crisis is already constraining South Korea’s economic growth. In Q1 2025, GDP shrank by 0.2%, ranking last among 19 countries with released data—mainly due to sluggish domestic demand. Bank of America forecasts that the population crisis will reduce South Korea’s economic growth rate to 1.8% in the 2030s and 1.1% in the 2040s.
Labor shortages and an aging workforce threaten economic vitality, fiscal sustainability, and innovation.
In 2023, 40% of Koreans over 65 lived below the poverty line—a figure likely to rise by 2060. Aging will strain pension and healthcare systems. Despite a $730 billion national pension fund, projections show it will stop growing by the 2040s and be depleted in the 2050s. From then, pensions must be supported by taxes from the working-age population. Sustaining the pension system requires 2–3 workers per retiree, but by 2060, there will be less than one worker per retiree. Tax revenue won’t be enough. Elderly poverty will become widespread, with many forced to work despite a lack of jobs.
Economic size is closely tied to labor force size. Population decline leads to industrial hollowing. Although South Korea’s working-age share was still higher than that of China, the U.S., or Japan in 2022, it will fall significantly by 2040. In 2023, the working-age population was 37 million, with GDP at $1.7 trillion. By 2060, the labor force will shrink to 17 million. Even with productivity gains, GDP may peak in the 2040s, then enter permanent decline. More optimistic forecasts defer the downturn to the 2050s—but these rely on unrealistic population assumptions. Science, technology, and innovation rely on a youthful workforce. Fewer workers will erode innovation, and tax revenue will plunge, making it difficult to sustain basic services such as hospitals. Infrastructure will suffer from a lack of scale, smaller communities may be abandoned, and population will concentrate in large cities, limiting future investment capacity.
Social and Cultural Collapse
Though forecasting societal change is challenging, the trends are stark. Currently, 20% of South Koreans live alone; 20% report having no close friends or relatives. By 2060, half of those in their 70s will have no siblings, 30% will have no children, and 25–35-year-olds will comprise just 5% of the population, most with no siblings. Elderly will have no family; young people will have few family or friends. Loneliness could reach unprecedented levels.
In 2000, the 25–45 age group numbered 17.5 million, 37% of the population, fueling K-pop and K-dramas. By 2060, this group will number just 5.6 million—16%. Cultural transmission will be disrupted by the shrinking youth population, and many traditions may vanish. The soul of Korean culture will shrink. Young people will face difficult upbringings. Schools and universities may close due to lack of students, job prospects will be dim, and political stability uncertain. Those unwilling to live alone will cluster in cities like Seoul—or emigrate. Rural areas and small towns will decline, and like Japan’s 10 million abandoned homes, some regions may be reclaimed by nature.
Why the Crisis Is Hard to Reverse
Once underway, a population crisis is nearly impossible to reverse. Even if the fertility rate miraculously rises to 2.1 and holds, by 2060 South Korea will still have an inverted pyramid structure, with only 1.5 working-age people per elderly citizen. A demographic bottleneck is inevitable. The government has rolled out various fertility incentives—childcare subsidies, extended parental leave—but with limited success. The 3.6% uptick in 2024 births may be a short-term fluctuation, not a long-term trend. Structural societal change is needed to sustain higher fertility.
Over the past 20 years, the government has spent hundreds of billions of dollars to boost fertility with little result. Young women’s voices have gone unheard, and policies have failed to address deeper social issues. In June 2024, President Yoon Suk-yeol declared a “national emergency” and created a Population Strategy Planning Department to address low fertility, aging, and immigration. Experts argue that fundamental reforms in childcare costs, workplace conditions, and gender equity are needed—not just subsidies. Some scholars suggest learning from China’s “two-child policy” by improving policy design.
Although some policies now help alleviate economic and social pressures on the young, cultural change takes time. Gender polarization and rising singlehood further complicate matters, requiring a broader overhaul of society.
Root Causes of the Crisis
As societies grow wealthier, more educated, and experience lower child mortality, fertility tends to decline. In South Korea, intense economic and social pressure exacerbates the trend.
South Korea’s rapid escape from poverty created a unique workaholic culture and extreme competitiveness. Though the legal workweek is 52 hours, overwork remains widespread. The government even proposed raising the cap to 69 hours. Wages are relatively low, living costs are high, real estate in big cities is unaffordable, and private tutoring costs are immense. Korea lags behind most developed countries in family welfare spending. High childcare, education, and housing costs deter young couples. Fierce job competition and workplace stress make balancing work and family difficult. High inflation and household debt suppress consumption. In Q1 2025, private consumption declined by 0.1% quarter-on-quarter. A sluggish housing market and high interest rates add to the pressure.
Cultural and gender issues also play a role. Traditional views make things worse: marriage is almost a prerequisite for childbirth (only 4.7% of babies in 2023 were born out of wedlock), and Korean men contribute the least to housework and childcare among OECD countries. Women are expected to juggle careers and domestic duties, while men shoulder the breadwinner role. As a result, many opt out of parenthood altogether. Discrimination against mothers—e.g., the “mom roach” (맘충) label—further discourages childbearing. Traditional expectations clash with modern women’s career aspirations, dragging down marriage and birth rates. Singlehood is surging. In 2024, the unmarried rate hit 51%, with an average age of 44.8. Gender division and social pressures fuel this trend. Korea must reconcile its traditions with modern needs and strengthen support for women and families, or risk deepening the crisis.
Conclusion
South Korea’s demographic crisis stems from ultra-low fertility, rapid aging, and natural population decline—driven by economic, social, and policy factors. With a 2023 fertility rate of just 0.72 and the elderly population surpassing 20% in 2024, the coming decades pose immense economic and social challenges. Emergency measures have been implemented, but deeper reforms are needed to address structural issues—childcare costs, workplace culture, and gender equity—to avert long-term collapse.
The demographic collapse is not unique to Korea. In 2023, fertility rates stood at 1.01 in China, 1.2 in Italy and Spain, 1.4 in Germany, and 1.6 in the U.K. and U.S. A fertility rate of 1.6 means a 60% population decline in four generations; 1.2 implies an 87% reduction. Fertility rates show no signs of stabilizing. Public discourse has yet to recognize the full severity of this issue. For the past century, concerns have centered on overpopulation. Today, arguments for childbirth seem contrarian. But low fertility is not just about labor shortages—it threatens the very foundations of society, culture, wealth, and ways of life. If modern societies do not urgently restructure to support family formation, the future will be grim. The demographic crisis is unstoppable and must be confronted head-on.