Over the past six months, the United States has become unfamiliar to many—but in some ways, it is quintessentially American.
Trump has established an “Efficiency Office” aimed at slashing the federal bureaucracy, cutting departments, budgets, and laying off civil servants. He has launched trade wars against 60 economies simultaneously, causing extreme volatility in capital markets. He has sanctioned Harvard University and suspended international student visas. He has openly broken ties with Elon Musk, trading blows on social media. He has deported illegal immigrants and dispatched the National Guard and Marine Corps to Los Angeles to restore order.
This Saturday, June 14, marks both the 250th anniversary of the founding of the U.S. Army and Trump’s 79th birthday. Trump is planning the largest military parade in decades. The conflict between his supporters and opponents is expected to reach a climax during the event.
It is worth asking: where does the present moment fit within the broader sweep of history? One hundred years from now, when people look back—just as we now look back on the 1920s—what will they say about the United States in the 2020s? What happened, why did it happen, and what impact did it leave behind?
01. The Struggle of the American People
Failing to understand Trump means failing to understand what is unfolding in the world today. And failing to understand today’s world is a dangerous position for the global elite—as the case of Harvard graduates and their families makes clear.
Trump is not easy to understand.
To his opponents, Trump is a tyrant, a dictator, a destroyer of the nation. To his supporters, he is a patriot, a defender of American interests and the Constitution.
The most confounding part is that both camps often use the same rhetoric, making it hard to tell them apart.
Consider the “No to Kings” advertisement published in The New York Times:
“We are a people of principle and honor. We respect our commitments and support our allies. We resist the aggression of dictators. We uphold and defend the Constitution…”
The ad was funded by Christy Walton, an heir of the Walmart fortune.
Yet, Trump frequently says the same things. He often talks about defending the Constitution. In his inaugural address, he said, “Every day from this day forward, I will fight for the American people.”
How should we understand this struggle?
It can be understood, first and foremost, as a classic American political struggle.
American political struggles take place within a federal system based on checks and balances. Within the constitutional framework, voters engage in open contests, which over time have solidified into a long-term rivalry between the Republican and Democratic parties, between left and right ideologies.
On nearly every issue—taxation, welfare, immigration, energy, gender—the two parties take opposing positions. Sometimes the differences are mild, sometimes sharp. There are, of course, moderates, centrists, and fence-sitters.
We are currently witnessing one of the most intense periods of this left–right, elephant–donkey struggle in recent memory. History shows that such conflict has, at times, reached presidential assassinations: Republican President McKinley in 1901, Democratic President Kennedy in 1963, and an attempt on Republican President Reagan in 1981, who narrowly survived.
After Reagan’s reform success in 1983, the U.S. entered a two-decade period of relative calm and economic growth. The partisan struggles eased, and there were no more assassination attempts.
But after the 2008 financial crisis, the conflict began to escalate again. President Obama’s perceived political lethargy during his eight-year tenure deepened societal divisions. The establishment weakened, polarization intensified, Trump emerged as a force within the GOP, and the Democratic Party fully embraced the far left. Last year’s election cycle saw an attempt on Trump’s life, marking a new peak in this ongoing struggle.
Many Chinese elites, who first encountered the U.S. in the 1980s—studying there or doing business with Americans—are unfamiliar with the Trump-era America and often react with visceral anger.
In their minds, America is a beacon. Leaders like Bush, Clinton, Hillary, even Biden, are seen as dignified. Trump, by contrast, appears thuggish, lacking in any sense of propriety. In fact, Reagan is perhaps the only political figure in modern memory who managed to remain composed after an assassination attempt. But make no mistake: this is a deadly serious political struggle.
Take immigration policy, for instance. During the Clinton era, the Democratic Party also opposed illegal immigration. In 2020, Biden, in alliance with the far left, defeated Trump in the election, and the Democrats shifted toward a policy of tolerance—or even encouragement—of illegal immigration.
This shift served three purposes:
Fulfilling campaign promises to the far left and immigrant communities to secure political support;
Increasing the labor supply to keep inflation in check;
Granting legal status to undocumented immigrants in the future to expand the Democratic voter base and suppress Republican power.
But for Republicans and their supporters, this is a “catastrophic” scenario. During Biden’s presidency, over 12 million illegal immigrants have entered the country—more than the population of many countries, and almost as many as during the previous three administrations combined.
This massive influx of illegal immigration has strained the federal budget, fueled drug abuse, raised security concerns, and triggered social unrest. The Democrats’ leniency has eroded the rule of law and treated lawful immigrants unfairly. It threatens the very foundation of America’s identity—its ability to attract global talent through institutional superiority.
Republicans are often labeled as “conservative,” but this is not a pejorative. It refers to their defense of traditional American values: moderation, family, law and order, constitutional principles, and Christian ethics. Biden is more left-leaning; Trump and his supporters have moved further right—toward a more radical version of conservatism.
On illegal immigration, Trump gives no ground. He tightens border controls, causes illegal crossings to plummet, and dispatches troops to crush resistance.
In international trade, Trump launches trade wars against 60 economies, disregards the interests of traditional Western allies, obsesses over trade surpluses, and pushes to bring manufacturing back to the U.S.—not just to North America.
On fiscal and debt issues, Trump tries to reduce deficits, cut public debt, and lower the national risk profile.
On national security, he reshapes homeland defense strategy, takes assertive stances on Greenland and the Panama Canal, treats Ukraine with a tough posture, and shows little regard for NATO, pressing Europe to enhance its military capabilities.
On energy, Trump favors fossil fuels, strengthens energy supply and security, and halts subsidies for green energy.
On taxation, he sticks to the Republican doctrine of tax cuts through the “Big Beautiful Act,” which promotes long-term economic growth, albeit at the cost of short-term fiscal strain.
On DEI (Diversity, Equity, Inclusion) policies, Trump goes on the offensive: he targets left-leaning Ivy League schools like Harvard and Columbia, demands the abolition of preferential policies for minority groups in admissions and hiring, denies the validity of non-binary genders, cracks down on anti-Semitism, and threatens to cut funding and international enrollment.
It is clear that Trump is attempting a sweeping reform of the U.S. under the banner of “national interest,” using blunt force to do it. Indeed, with over 12 million illegal immigrants arriving in just four years, any country would struggle to cope—and any government would need to act.
Why is it so hard in the U.S.?
First, because this is America—this is classic American political struggle. Second, because this goes beyond America’s borders—this is a global conflict.
02. The Crisis of Globalization
This struggle, viewed internally, is a battle between two major American factions—left and right ideologies. Viewed externally, it appears to be a conflict between nations. But at its core, it is a battle between the beneficiaries and the casualties of globalization.
Why frame it as a conflict between globalization’s winners and losers?
Here’s one example that makes it plain:
Many Americans criticize Trump—and so do many Chinese and Europeans. But if Trump were only dealing with domestic American issues, why would Chinese or European citizens be so emotionally invested?
The modern world is deeply interconnected through globalization, and the United States is one of the most integrated players. Trump’s policies inevitably affect global interests, especially those of beneficiaries under the previous global order.
Today’s global elite are, by and large, the beneficiaries of globalization. This group includes: Western political establishments, traditional financial giants, tech conglomerates, manufacturers and traders from emerging economies, intellectuals, media professionals, university professors, and far-left factions. Harvard University, of course, is part of this elite network.
Here’s a telling statistic: Over the past decade, U.S. universities have dramatically increased their enrollment of international students, particularly from China. Chinese students account for 23% of Harvard’s international student population, 47% at Columbia, and 50% at Cornell.
Why admit so many international and Chinese students? Partly in the name of diversity and internationalization—but also to generate revenue. In 2023, Columbia University earned $900 million from international students, UC Berkeley $500 million, the University of Chicago $400 million, and Harvard $380 million.
Most U.S. universities are private institutions. Participating in globalization to generate income is understandable. But what exactly are Trump’s supporters opposing? Why are so many people so angry about, for example, speeches by Harvard graduates?
Trump and his supporters believe that the previous global order was unfair and enabled the elite to monopolize resources and opportunities across sectors.
Think about it: Twenty years ago, would you have been infuriated watching a Harvard graduate’s commencement speech?
Probably not. Nor would I. Back then, there was still real social mobility. Today, class stratification has solidified—both in the East and the West. A transnational elite class has emerged, forming a “net” over society, leaving ordinary people feeling suffocated.
In the past, many looked to America as a beacon. Today, that beacon’s elite are seen as colluding with elites from around the world. The light has dimmed.
Though most people can’t compete with Harvard graduates, what troubles the lower classes is that the global elite not only monopolize resources and access—they also seem smarter and work harder. Put another way, Harvard is a symbol of a deeper, global problem: class rigidity, resource monopoly, and blocked mobility across all domains.
Today, dialogue between Trump supporters and opponents is nearly impossible. Most members of the global elite oppose, ignore, resent, or rage against Trump. Some of the disaffected, ironically, side with the very elite structures that hurt them, and join in the chorus of anti-Trump sentiment.
This isn’t surprising—because even among the global elite, few truly understand what’s wrong with globalization. In their education and worldview, globalization is unquestionably right, universally beneficial, and promotes—not inhibits—class mobility.
But what’s wrong with the global order?
Let’s examine two major problems embedded in the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO):
First, the WTO has succeeded in drastically reducing visible tariffs, but it is powerless against invisible tariffs.
What are invisible tariffs? They are non-monetary trade barriers: restrictions or price distortions not imposed through duties, such as import quotas, export subsidies, capital controls, exchange rate manipulation, market entry barriers, intellectual property enforcement, labor protections, and environmental standards. These barriers are flexible, targeted, discriminatory, and covert. I call them “invisible tariffs.”
Second, the WTO promotes the global flow of goods and capital, but has failed to facilitate the global movement of labor.
This is a huge problem—and one that gets little attention. The current global order is extremely favorable to capital. Central banks around the world have flooded markets with cheap money. Capital moves freely, pursuing high returns and low taxes. But labor mobility remains severely restricted. Workers in many regions face job loss and low wages at home, while also being heavily taxed locally.
These mismatches between visible and invisible tariffs, and between capital mobility and labor immobility, distort global prices for goods, finance, labor, and other economic factors. The result is massive misallocation of resources, a growing imbalance in trade and finance, worsening macroeconomic instability, and widening disparities in household wealth.
In concrete terms, this manifests in the following global problems:
In countries like the U.S.: Trade deficits worsen, manufacturing erodes, structural unemployment rises, financial surpluses expand, sovereign debt balloons, currencies are over-issued, and wealth gaps widen.
In trade-surplus nations: Macroeconomic growth surges, but due to price distortions, income growth lags. Foreign exchange inflows lead to currency and credit expansion, resulting in over-investment in fixed assets, overcapacity in production, asset bubbles in real estate, and rising debt in local governments and private sectors. These economies fall into a trap of high growth, high debt, low income, low inflation, and low welfare consumption.
Globally: Financial and trade imbalances amplify income inequality, deepen the gap between finance and the real economy, and widen disparities between capital and labor.
Systemically: These imbalances generate second-order disasters—intensifying class conflict, social fragmentation, political polarization, and even interstate conflict.
So ultimately, today’s conflict is indeed one between the winners and losers of globalization. Those who support free trade may not actually support globalization—only the version that benefits them. Those who oppose free trade may not reject globalization entirely—they may be fighting to reshape it in ways that no longer exclude them.
03. An Era of Profound Transformation
Of course, the problem is not with globalization itself, but with the issues that easily emerge along the path of globalization.
Globalization inherently challenges the role of the nation-state. It is a process in which national sovereignty is gradually relinquished. Every step forward in globalization represents a step backward for national control. At the core, these problems arise because national institutions distort global market prices—yet we are still unable to free ourselves from the grip of the nation-state. That is the fundamental contradiction.
In 1989, Francis Fukuyama argued that over the past century, class ideologies had collapsed worldwide, while nationalism had triumphed. Democratic values such as freedom and human rights could only survive within the framework of the nation-state.
However, Fukuyama may have overlooked something: as globalization has advanced, nationalism has gradually weakened. Nation-states have become distorted, and class ideologies are now making a comeback—driven by the emergence of a new global elite. To be clear, I hesitate to use the term “class,” but there seems to be no better word to describe this reality.
How can we solve this complex problem?
Ideally, major powers should come together to renegotiate international trade and financial rules—narrowing the gap between visible and invisible tariffs, and addressing the imbalance between capital mobility and labor immobility.
But this requires both opportunity and leadership.
Our current global system was established after World War II. Its trade, monetary, and financial frameworks originate from the Bretton Woods system of 1944 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947. At Bretton Woods, the British economist John Maynard Keynes helped shape the postwar order. As early as 1941, after the U.S. passed the Lend-Lease Act, the Allied powers were already planning the structure of the postwar economy. Keynes aimed to ensure that wartime debts and agreements with the U.S. would not trap Britain in a weak position, and, like many of his contemporaries, believed that the postwar trade and currency arrangements must avoid repeating the mistakes made after World War I.
Before Trump came to power, the U.S. attempted to work with Europe and Japan within the WTO framework to reform the rules, reduce trade barriers, and facilitate the global flow of resources. But the global web of vested interests—spanning East and West, across the Pacific and Atlantic—was too entrenched. No one was willing to compromise, and the talks ultimately failed.
Trump, upon taking office, tried to use state power to achieve what negotiations could not. The question is: Can national confrontation really solve the problem?
It depends on how we define the role of the nation:
If we see the state as a means—using confrontation to force negotiation—then it may indeed help lower invisible trade barriers. A new global trade framework could be built on the basis of reducing such barriers.
But if we see the state as an end—as something to be strengthened for its own sake—then the world may move in the opposite direction of globalization, increasing the risk of international conflict.
Globalization is a process that continually weakens national institutions while empowering individuals. The right path is to push globalization forward—through the U.S. working with other countries to reduce non-tariff barriers, open financial markets, facilitate labor mobility, and provide global public goods to curb war and chaos.
Charles Kindleberger (1986) argued that during the Great Depression, the U.S. abandoned its responsibility to provide global public goods—leaving the gold standard, shutting down trade—thus accelerating the crisis.
Trump’s urgency in strengthening America’s state apparatus risks creating short-term hazards—namely, a shortage of global public goods. These include the international supply of dollars, the sharing of information, technology, and talent, the maintenance of global trade and financial rules, and the prevention of geopolitical conflict.
If global public goods fall short, the global elite—who rely on international systems—will suffer significant setbacks. Should this lead to financial crises or war, it would severely damage America’s global standing and national credibility.
Keep in mind: America’s founding strength lies in its ability to attract global talent through institutional advantages. As a nation of immigrants, the U.S. government should not alienate its customers—i.e., international elite—nor should it deny them access to its top universities.
Among all the issues in globalization, immigration may be the most challenging.
I’ve said before: if labor could flow freely across borders, the world might face more small problems, but would have far fewer big ones.
Since the emergence of the modern nation-state—especially in the last hundred years—people have been unable to move freely. Today, the global labor market is open only to the elite, which distorts pricing and contributes to the imbalance between labor and capital.
What would a more reasonable global immigration policy look like?
Some argue that while people do not choose their country of birth, they should have the freedom to choose their country of residence once they reach adulthood. Far-left proponents reject the concept of “illegal immigration” and view Trump’s deportation policies as a violation of human liberty.
The immigration policies under Clinton and George W. Bush were tailored for the previous era of globalization—favoring elite migration. Biden’s lax policies are far-left in nature and have undermined this system. Interestingly, Trump’s immigration policy, though controversial, actually attempts to restore the older globalization framework.
So how should we adjust global immigration?
Economics tells us that every action occurs under constraints and entails marginal costs. In other words, no one can act entirely as they please. Wanting to move to the U.K. is like wanting to visit a neighbor—it depends on their consent.
That said, my intuition tells me: the world will not descend into chaos.